

Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

2WC12 Cryptography I – Fall 2014

Ruben Niederhagen

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TU / **e**

Technische Universiteit
Eindhoven
University of Technology

Recall from last lecture:

- ▶ **Public-key crypto:**
 - Pair of keys: public key for encryption, private key for decryption.

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Advantages, disadvantages..?

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- ▶ **Idea of a block cipher:** partition the text into “large” (e.g. 128bit) blocks; encode each block independently.
→ The same “key” is used for each block.

Stream Ciphers:

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- ▶ state-driven: operates on arbitrary message length
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Encrypt the *message stream* with the *key stream* to *cipher stream*.

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An n -bit block cipher is a function $E : \{0, 1\}^n \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.
For each fixed key $K \in \mathcal{K}$ the map

$$E_K : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, M \mapsto E_K(M)$$


is invertible (bijective) with inverse $E_K^{-1} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.

Modes of Operation:

- ▶ electronic codebook (ECB) mode,
- ▶ cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode,
- ▶ cipher feedback (CFB) mode,
- ▶ output feedback (OFB) mode,
- ▶ counter (CTR) mode.


Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode:

- ▶ Encryption:
obtain ciphertext C_1, \dots, C_t as
 $C_i = E_K(M_i), i = 1 \dots t$



Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode:

- ▶ Decryption:
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
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Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode decryption


Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) Mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector (IV) of length n bits.

► Encryption:

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$$C_i = E_K(M_i \oplus C_{i-1}), \quad i = 1 \dots t, \quad C_0 = IV$$




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
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
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
Output Feedback (OFB) Mode:

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
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
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
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- ▶ ECB is considered insecure if applied to more than one block: Identical input blocks are mapped to identical output blocks.
- ▶ In CBC and CFB mode, the last ciphertext block C_t depends on all message blocks M_1, \dots, M_t , in ECB, OFB, and CTR mode each block of ciphertext C_i only on message block M_i .
- ▶ CBC, CFB, and OFB encryption can not be performed in parallel on several blocks, ECB and CTR encryption can. CBC and CFB decryption also can be performed in parallel.
- ▶ Only ECB and CTR allow random access to the ciphertext.
- ▶ CBC and ECB require padding of the input to a multiple of the block size, CFB, OFB, and CTR don't.
- ▶ For OFB, CFB, and CTR mode each two messages encrypted with the same key must use a different IV .
- ▶ Most widely used modes are CBC and CTR.

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- ▶ **Aug 1976:** IBM publishes the DES algorithm. "NSA worked closely with IBM to strengthen the algorithm against all except brute force attacks and to strengthen substitution tables, called S-boxes. Conversely, NSA tried to convince IBM to reduce the length of the key from 64 to 48 bits. Ultimately they compromised on a 56-bit key."
- ▶ **Mar 1977:** NSA publishes the DES algorithm as a Federal Standard. NSA modified the S-boxes.
- ▶ **July 1991:** Biham and Shamir (re-)discover differential cryptanalysis that requires 2^{47} chosen plaintexts. New S-boxes are stronger than the original S-boxes.

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- ▶ **Nov. 2008:** The successor of COPACOBANA, the RIVYERA machine reduces the average time to less than one single day.

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 - RCG (Rivest, Robshaw, Sidney, Yin),
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- ▶ **October 2nd, 2000:** NIST announces Rijndael as winner.

Parameters:

- ▶ fixed block size of 128bit,
- ▶ variable key size (in bits): AES-128, AES-192, AES-256.

Animation:

http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/cs381-05/blockciphers/rijndael_ingles2004.swf

Rijndael S-box:

For y in $GF(2^8) = GF(2)[x]/(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)$ compute

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} z_0 \\ z_1 \\ z_2 \\ z_3 \\ z_4 \\ z_5 \\ z_6 \\ z_7 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

with $z = y^{-1}$.

Rijndael S-box:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
00	63	7c	77	7b	f2	6b	6f	c5	30	01	67	2b	fe	d7	ab	76
10	ca	82	c9	7d	fa	59	47	f0	ad	d4	a2	af	9c	a4	72	c0
20	b7	fd	93	26	36	3f	f7	cc	34	a5	e5	f1	71	d8	31	15
30	04	c7	23	c3	18	96	05	9a	07	12	80	e2	eb	27	b2	75
40	09	83	2c	1a	1b	6e	5a	a0	52	3b	d6	b3	29	e3	2f	84
50	53	d1	00	ed	20	fc	b1	5b	6a	cb	be	39	4a	4c	58	cf
60	d0	ef	aa	fb	43	4d	33	85	45	f9	02	7f	50	3c	9f	a8
70	51	a3	40	8f	92	9d	38	f5	bc	b6	da	21	10	ff	f3	d2
80	cd	0c	13	ec	5f	97	44	17	c4	a7	7e	3d	64	5d	19	73
90	60	81	4f	dc	22	2a	90	88	46	ee	b8	14	de	5e	0b	db
a0	e0	32	3a	0a	49	06	24	5c	c2	d3	ac	62	91	95	e4	79
b0	e7	c8	37	6d	8d	d5	4e	a9	6c	56	f4	ea	65	7a	ae	08
c0	ba	78	25	2e	1c	a6	b4	c6	e8	dd	74	1f	4b	bd	8b	8a
d0	70	3e	b5	66	48	03	f6	0e	61	35	57	b9	86	c1	1d	9e
e0	e1	f8	98	11	69	d9	8e	94	9b	1e	87	e9	ce	55	28	df
f0	8c	a1	89	0d	bf	e6	42	68	41	99	2d	0f	b0	54	bb	16

Optimizations for 32-bit Architectures:

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High-Speed Implementations:

- ▶ NaCl: <http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html>
- ▶ <http://cryptojedi.org/crypto/index.shtml#aesbs>

Plaintext-Based Attacks:

- ▶ known plaintext
- ▶ chosen plaintext
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Linear Cryptanalysis:

- ▶ known plaintext attack
- ▶ statistical analysis against large amounts of plaintext

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- ▶ adaptive chosen ciphertext

Linear Cryptanalysis:

- ▶ known plaintext attack
- ▶ statistical analysis against large amounts of plaintext

Differential Cryptanalysis:

- ▶ chosen plaintext attack
- ▶ statistical analysis of the difference of two inputs and the difference of the outputs

Stream and Block Ciphers:

Chapter 6 and 7, *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*,
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone,
CRC Press, 1996.

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AES Proposal Rijndael,
Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen

Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis:

A Tutorial on Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis,
Howard M. Heys